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 El objetivo de este estudio es examinar las pequeñas empresas familiares desde el punto de vista de los efectos de las relaciones 
familiares en la propiedad y en la gestión de costos de agencia 
causados por la financiación con deuda, y en su performance. Para 
lograr este objetivo hemos revisado la literatura sobre empresas 
familiares desde la perspectiva de la Teoría de Agencia, proponiendo 
un modelo de investigación que pone de relieve los vínculos entre las 
variables. Este trabajo añade a la literatura tres contribuciones: ayuda a 
explicar cómo los comportamientos disfuncionales pueden perpetuar 
las limitaciones de la pequeña empresa o incluso su fracaso, hace la 
propuesta de la comprensión de los mecanismos de gobierno 
corporativo en pequeñas empresas familiares y se profundiza la 
discusión de la investigación previa a través de un conjunto de 
proposiciones. Creemos que una comparación sistemática de los 
diferentes contextos proporciona nuevos conocimientos sobre la 
gobernanza de las pequeñas empresas familiares. En la última sección 
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The aim of this study is to examine the effects of family involvement 
in ownership and family involvement in management on agency costs 
of debt financing, as well on the performance of small family 
business. To achieve this objective, we reviewed the literature on 
family business, and drawing from agency theory we proposed a 
research model that highlights the links between the variables. Our 
paper makes contributions to the literature in three ways. Firstly, it 
helps to explain how dysfunctional behaviours may perpetuate small 
business constraints or even failure. Secondly, it advances the 
understanding of corporate governance mechanisms in small family 
business. And finally, it deepens the discussion of prior research, by 
advancing a set of propositions. We believe that a systematic 
comparison of different contexts provides new insights into small 
family business governance. Implications and directions for future 
research appear in the last section. 
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Small firms are the backbone of the world 
economy and the role they play in economic 
growth, employment, and poverty alleviation is 
unquestionable. For instance, Wymenga, 
Spanikova, Barker, Konings, and Canton (2012) 
report that small and medium enterprises 
account for 99.8% of non-financial enterprises, 
providing 67.4% of jobs and sharing 58.1% of 
the gross value added in the European Union. 
Despite this fact, small firms often face 
difficulties in obtaining equity and debt 
financing, which constrains their development 
and success (Storey, 1994), and many of these 
shortcomings are caused by potential conflicts 
of interest and asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders. In this regard, it is 
important to note that contractual solutions are 
available to large firms (Smith & Warner, 
1979), but often not to smaller ventures 
(Peterson & Rajan, 1994). Debt financing of 
small firms is more complicated by their 
liability of newness and opacity in terms of 
available information (Berger & Udell, 2002), 
and since what functions for large firms may not 
work for small firms, there is an opportunity for 
conducting additional research on small family 
firms’ debt financing.  
In undertaking such research, the salient 
features of small firms, which are the family 
involvement in ownership, in management, and 
the employment of several family members in 
the firm (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999), 
must be considered because they embody 
behaviours and dynamics that are unique to, and 
introduced by, family members (Kidwell, 
Eddleston, Cater, & Kellermanns, 2012), and 
that may cause conflicts. Additionally, they can 
distinguish family from non-family firms, and 
simultaneously explain variations of behaviour 
within family firms (Chrisman, Chua, & 
Sharma, 2005). In this regard, family business 
becomes a unique area of research that has 
experienced an exponential growth, and many 
researchers have attempted to define such firms 
(Chua et al., 1999), while others have attempted 
to examine and explain not only the extent to 
which the family involvement affects firm 
performance, but also whether family firms 
differ from non-family firms (e.g. Chrisman, 
Chua, & Litz, 2004; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008; 
Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009). These 
attempts yield inconsistent results (e.g. 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Sciascia & Mazzola, 
2008) and, since as stated previously, the 
majority of firms worldwide are small, unlisted 
ventures, research focuses almost exclusively on 
large publicly-traded firms (e.g. Anderson, 
Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Chu, 2009). Just to 
exemplify, researchers conclude that family and 
non-family firms are clearly different, for 
instance, in terms of goals (Chrisman et al., 
2005), equity (Romano, Tanewsky, & 
Smyrnios, 2000), corporate governance 
(Randøy & Goel, 2003), international structures 
and strategies (Zahra, 2003), and sources of debt 
financing (Voordeckers & Steijvers, 2008; 
Chua, Chrisman, Kellermanns, & Wu, 2011). 
On the other hand, others conclude that the 
relationship between family involvement and 
firm performance is too complex and is very 
likely to be moderated or mediated by factors 
that are not included in the analyses (Chrisman, 
Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012). For example, 
Chrisman et al. (2004) examined small 
privately-owned US family and non-family 
firms and found an insignificant effect of family 
involvement on sales growth.  Herrero (2011) 
found positive effects of family involvement on 
the efficiency of fishing business, while 
Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) report results 
revealing that the maintenance of management 
within the family has a negative impact on firm 
performance. 
Similar results were reported by Sciascia and 
Mazzola (2008), concluding that the 
relationship between family involvement in 
management and performance is negative and 
non-linear, and that family involvement in 
ownership does not significantly affect firm 
performance.  Steijvers, Voordeckers and Sigrid 
(2007), using a sample frame of 2,865 small 
family firms, found that firms led by a family 
manager holding a large ownership share 
(≥80%) or being accompanied by few other 
owners, have significantly lower profitability. 
These results suggest that there are some family 
behaviours or activities that destroy firm value. 
In this line, Cater et al. (2006) report that 30% 
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of small businesses pass to the second 
generation, 12% pass to the third generations, 
and 4% to the fourth generations.  
Even with this steady increase of studies on 
family firms, it is notable that the link between 
family involvement and agency cost of debt 
financing in small family firms remains 
relatively unexplored (e.g. Steijvers & 
Voordeckers, 2009; Chua, Chrisman, 
Kellermanns, Wu, 2011). Given the scant 
empirical studies on this stream of research, and 
being consistent with the previous research on 
family firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & 
Buchholtz, 2001), this study aims to examine 
the effects of family involvement in ownership 
and in management on agency costs of debt 
financing, as well on performance. To attain this 
objective, we review the literature on small 
family firms, and we overarch our arguments on 
agency theory by highlighting the conflicts 
rooted in the relationship between borrowers 
and lenders (Voordeckers & Steijvers, 2006). 
The paper is structured as follows. First, the 
literature on family business is reviewed. This is 
followed by a section on the research model in 
which the propositions are discussed and 
presented. The last section is devoted to the 
discussion, and directions for future research.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Agency theory highlights the conflict rooted 
in the separation of ownership from control, that 
is, the principal-agent problem (Ross, 1973). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
shareholding causes de facto delegation of some 
decision-making authority from the firm’s 
owners to its agents. This delegation of 
authority exposes agents at every level of the 
firm to risks for which they are not fully 
compensated. This uncompensated risk gives 
agents the incentive to free-ride or shirk in an 
effort to obtain additional compensation 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002), creating 
information asymmetries (Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981) that make it possible for agents to engage 
in self-serving behaviour that, if unmonitored, 
would threaten firm survival (Meyer & Zucker, 
1989), thereby damaging the interests of 
principals and other stakeholders (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a).  
It is difficult for the principal to monitor the 
actions of the agents in a situation where there is 
information asymmetry. In such circumstances 
agency costs arise, representing the cost of all 
activities and operating systems designed to 
align the interests and/or actions of managers 
(agents) with the interests of owners 
(principals). From this point, researchers have 
realized that both concentrated ownership and 
owner-management mitigate these conflicts and 
costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Fleming, 2005). Fama and Jensen 
(1983), for example, argue that the family 
management model is especially efficient, 
because owner-management allows alignment 
of interests, and substitutes the costly control 
mechanisms that non-owner-manager firms use 
to mitigate agency costs. In this sense, family 
businesses embody the beliefs, norms of 
reciprocity, aspirations, common histories, and 
self-concepts that are likely to create 
collectivistic behaviour (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997), which, in turn, tempers self-
serving behaviour, and the conflict it can cause, 
by fostering loyalty and commitment to the 
family and firm (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). As 
such, theory suggests that there should be little 
need to offer these agents performance 
incentives (Fama & Jensen, 1983, 1985) or 
implement formal monitoring mechanisms 
(Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 
2007), which might even be counter-productive 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this line, 
Chrisman et al. (2007) argue that family firms 
are an exclusive field of interest because 
conflicts between owners and managers are 
minimized as a result of altruism and family 
involvement in both ownership and 
management.  Accordingly, previous empirical 
evidence reveals that family involvement 
generally has positive effects on the 
performance of listed firms (Anderson et al., 
2003; Vilalonga & Amitt, 2006, Maury, 2006; 
Chu, 2009), but the results for non-listed firms 
are mixed. For example, Chrisman et al. (2004) 
examined 1,141 small privately-held US family 
and non-family firms and found that agency 
costs are less severe in family businesses, in 
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spite of the insignificant effect of family 
involvement on sales growth. Likewise, Herrero 
(2011) found positive effects of family 
involvement on the efficiency of fishing 
business, while Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) 
report results revealing that the maintenance of 
management within the family has a negative 
impact on firm performance. Similar results 
were reported by Sciascia and Mazzola (2008), 
concluding that the relationship between family 
involvement in management and performance is 
negative and non-linear, and that family 
involvement in ownership does not significantly 
influence firm performance. This suggests, 
however, that family involvement may increase 
agency costs. In this regard, Minichilli, 
Corbetta, and MacMillan (2010) report a 
positive U-shaped effect attributed to schisms in 
family, and Mazzola, Sciascia and Kellermans 
(2012), based on a sample of 294 small 
privately-held family firms, report an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between family 
involvement and firm performance.  These 
results suggest that concentrated ownership and 
owner-management can mitigate the traditional 
agency problems, but in contrast, create specific 
agency problems (e.g. Schulze et al., 2002; 
Schulze et al., 2003a). That is, family 
involvement has advantages and disadvantages.  
This stream of research rests on Lansberg’s 
(1983) assumptions that institutional overlap 
nature of family business may cause a 
managerial dilemma, such that social relations 
in the family are structured to satisfy family 
members’ various development needs 
(Lansberg, 1983). On the other hand, a 
business’s fundamental function is the 
generation of goods and services at competitive 
prices in order to maximize firm profits. Hence, 
social relations in firms are, or should be, 
guided by principles and norms that facilitate 
the productive process.  However, the linking of 
the parents’/owners’ welfare with that of their 
children compels owner-managers to place non-
economic family goals (e.g. family harmony, 
social status) before the economic goals of their 
firms (Chrisman et al., 2012). In other words, 
family owner-managers may have aspirations 
and goals that conflict with those of the 
business; for example, employing family 
members independently of their skill, may be 
more important to the leaders of family firms 
than the objective of maximizing profits 
(Kidwell et al., 2012), which ultimately may 
cause conflicts (Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 
2002) because the family is not a homogeneous 
group of people with the same set of interests, 
goals and motivations. Thus, we argue that if 
the heterogeneous interests and their potential 
conflicts among family members are not well 
managed they may threaten firm profitability, 
destroy firm and family assets (Kidwell et al., 
2012), and negatively affect the bargaining 
power with principals’ suppliers, namely 
financial institutions (Voordeckers & Steijvers, 
2006). There is evidence of a positive 
association between external finance and 
business performance (Keasy & McGuiness, 
1990).  This is because the provision of debt 
financing by a bank to a small business is 
essentially an agency problem in which the bank 
(principal) is using the firm (agent) to generate a 
return on money advance.  Thus, the firm incurs 
an implicit (personal and business collateral) 
and explicit cost (interest tax, credit rationing).   
 
3. Research Model and Propositions 
 
3.1. Family Involvement (in ownership and 
management) and Agency Cost of Debt 
Financing  
One of the outstanding characteristics of 
small firms is the involvement of family in the 
business through ownership and management. 
Therefore, it is argued that an increase in family 
involvement influences the potential that a firm 
will adopt distinct goals (Chrisman et al., 2012), 
behaviours, and outcomes (Tagiuri & Davis, 
1992, 1996; Chrisman et al., 2005; Dyer, 2006). 
This is because it provides sufficient latitude for 
decision-making, and it is expected that as the 
number of family members increases, the more 
the interests should be aligned (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Such alignment will thus lower the 
agency costs derived by the asymmetric 
information (Jensen & Fama, 1976). In this line, 
researchers agree on the fact that family 
involvement often requires long term affinities 
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within the firm, which brings benefits for the 
owners with longer investment horizons 
(Faccio, 2010). These are: less managerial 
myopia (Stein, 1989), efficient investments 
(James, 1999), and better control of managers’ 
activities (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In addition, 
family firms with large undiversified assets are 
usually, as stated above, to be long-term 
investors with substantial wealth at risk, and 
willing to pass the firm to their heirs in order to 
maintain the control. Furthermore, the long-term 
perspective can be constructive in building trust 
between firms and financial institutions 
(Teijevers & Vooddeckers, 2009), since 
servicing the firm’s debt is necessary for 
survival, because it aligns the interests of the 
lender and borrower (Chua et al., 2011). As 
such, family firms incur a lower probability of 
pledging collateral or personal commitments 
(Steijvers, Voordeckers, W., & Vanhoof, 2010), 
and lenders are less exposed to risk, a 
circumstance which should make them more 
willing to lend to family firms (Smith & 
Warner, 1979). This is consistent with the 
results reported by Anderson et al. (2003) that 
founding family ownership impacts upon the 
agency cost of debt, suggesting thus, that 
founding family firms have an incentive 
structure that results in few agency conflicts 
between equity and debt claimants. Put 
differently, family involvement in ownership 
may reduce the agency costs of debt financing 
because of the lower probability of managerial 
opportunism, higher risk aversion, and long-
term orientation. However, the literature 
concerned with both agency theory and family 
firms is inconclusive about whether family 
involvement alone, affects the creditworthiness 
of a firm because such involvement may 
increase or reduce the agency cost of debt 
financing. Based on the above arguments, we 
propose that:  
P1: Family involvement in ownership will 
have an U-shaped relationship with the agency 
cost of debt financing. 
P2: Family involvement in management will 
have an U-shaped relationship with the agency 
cost of debt financing. 
 
3.2. Family Involvement (in ownership and 
management) and Small Family Firm 
Performance  
The effects of family involvement in 
ownership and management on firm 
performance have been reported by many 
scholars. For example, McConaughy, Walker, 
Henderson, and Mishra (1998) present evidence 
that firm value is higher when ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of the founding family 
than when the ownership is concentrated, but 
not in the hands of the founding family. In the 
same vein, Anderson and Reeb (2003), by using 
a sample of firms from the S & P 500, conclude 
that accounting profitability measures are higher 
for owner-managed firms but market value 
creation is higher for those with founding family 
ownership and either a founding CEO or non-
family CEO.  
As they observed later, the superiority in 
performance is tempered by the need to balance 
the interests of the family, as the dominant 
shareholder, against those of other shareholders 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 
2004). Chrisman et al. (2002) also observed that 
family involvement in ownership enhances the 
first year sales of new ventures, and Zahra 
(2003) reports higher sales in international 
operations of family firms, suggesting thus, that 
family involvement reduces the agency costs. In 
their study, Chrisman et al. (2004) also report 
that short-term sales growth for small family 
and non-family firms are statistically equal, and 
that strategic planning, as a mechanism for 
controlling agency costs, has a stronger positive 
effect on the performance of non-family firms. 
These results suggest that even if the overall 
agency costs of family businesses are not 
negative, they are lower than those in non-
family firms, which is consistent with Fama and 
Jensen (1983) who assumed that when 
ownership and management reside within a 
family, agency costs would be lower, if not 
absent. Yet, recent studies have also concluded 
that small family firms could be very vulnerable 
to agency problems (Schulze et al., 2001, 2002; 
2003a; Chrisman et al., 2005), because a family 
is not necessarily a homogeneous group of 
people with congruent interests (Sharma, 
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Chrisman & Chua, 1997), and is often plagued 
by substantial conflicts. That is, families are 
emotional entities and their relationships are 
characterized by complexities arising from 
family members’ self-interest, perspective, and 
identity conflicts with moral and filial duties 
towards other family members (Schulze et al., 
2003a). If these conflicts are not managed, they 
can result in negative emotions like resentment 
and animosity (Schulze et al. 2003a; Chrisman 
et al., 2005), which are extrapolated to the 
business arena by family involvement. Those 
conflicts may come at particularly high costs in 
family firms because family members are 
confined within the firm, thereby making 
conflicts more persistent and interests more 
difficult to align (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 
2003b; Kellermanns & Eddlesson, 2004). For 
example, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) 
found that relationships within the family firm 
are capable of reducing firm value through 
excessive compensation, related party-
transactions or special dividends.  
In the same vein, it is argued that nepotism 
often characterizes the selection of managers by 
family owners, with the subsequent negative 
impact on company management and results 
(Lansberg, 1983), and that particularism makes 
it difficult for owning families to effectively 
evaluate family members (Dyer, 2006), and 
dismiss them in the case of unsatisfactory 
performance (Gomez-Meja, Nunez-Nickel, & 
Gutierrez, 2001). In other words, the war of love 
and hatred typical of kinship ties, blinds the 
family members, destroys family assets, and 
removes the opportunity to join synergy and 
turn the firms into more competitive and 
profitable entities. As a result, these family 
firms will shortly become failed firms that 
perform poorly on both family and business 
dimensions (Sharma, 2004). In summary, while 
family involvement in ownership may reduce 
and increase the agency costs of debt financing, 
this led us to argue, as observed by Sciascia and 
Mazzola (2008), that it may have both positive 
and negative effects on small family 
performance. Thus, we propose that: 
P3: Family involvement in ownership will 
have an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
small family firm performance. 
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have an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
small family firm performance. 
 
4. Discussion and Directions for Future 
Research  
In this article we tried to understand how 
family involvement influences firm 
performance, by mitigating the agency costs of 
debt financing. In so doing, we reviewed the 
literature on the family business and proposed a 
research model that highlights the directional 
paths between the constructs, in an integrated 
fashion. As observed by researchers (e.g. 
Schulze et al., 2001, Chrisman et al., 2005; 
Lubatkin et al., 2005), the two constructs 
(family involvement in ownership and in 
management) have provided the primary means 
for defining family firms (Chua et al., 1999; 
Sharma, 2004), and we perceived that firms 
with similar dynamics may not all consider 
themselves family firms. Therefore, by 
considering the fact that family firms differ in 
many dimensions from non-family firms 
(Chrisman et al., 2004, 2005), and, mostly, tend 
to pursue non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 
2012), both family involvement in ownership 
and in management may have positive and 
negative impacts on family business 
performance. This incorporation of this 
knowledge into an agency theory of the family 
firm is a very promising direction because the 
interlocking of systems within family firms 
(Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997) 
is complex in nature, and to understand this 
complexity, researchers may need to examine 
those relationships in a non-linear manner. 
These indications were observed in the studies 
conducted by Chrisman et al. (2004) and 
Sciascia and Mazzola (2008), and more recently 
by Mazzola et al. (2012) who found an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the variables.  
In summary, our study has some theoretical 
implications. Firstly, by focusing on agency 
theory, our research model captures a wide array 
of the dynamics within family firms and helps 
to explain the uniqueness of conflicts (that can 
arise because of the self-serving behaviour and 
asymmetric altruism) and their remedies. 
Secondly, in this we are in a better position to 
argue that the effects of agency costs on 
performance cannot be completely understood 
without taking into account the affinities among 
family members in the family firms, as well the 
communalities within the systems that govern 
the family firms. Thus, by integrating these two 
components in one model, we present a vast 
array of ideas about how family involvement 
and altruism may distinguish family and non-
family firms in terms of performance. The 
model makes certain propositions. We believe, 
however, that empirical evaluation must be 
conducted to ascertain the validity of these 
propositions. A starting point for achieving this 
objective is, actually, to collect data, and 
examine whether and how the current 
frameworks can be applied within a different 
economic environment.  
In conclusion, the family firm is an 
interesting topic of research and additional 
studies are needed on the conflicts of family 
firms and how they can be addressed. In this 
respect, we need to know what really makes 
some family owner-managed firms less willing 
to behave in a pro-organizational manner and 
behave more like one would expect the non-
family firm to behave. 
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